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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF
SALT LAKE CITY, a public
entity,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.

Case No. 870236

JUANITA IRENE BURGE, ROBERT
D- BARROWS, JR; BEATRICE
IRENE BARROWS; et al.
Defendants/Appellants

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant
to the provisions of § 3 and 5, Article VIII of the Utah
Constitution; § 78-2-2 Utah Code Ann,, 1953 (1987 Supp.), and
Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether paragraph 1(d) of the Order of Immediate

Occupancy requires that possession of the subject property
must

be

transferred

to the plaintiff

as a condition of

plaintiff's duty to pay interest required by paragraph 1(a),
or whether 1(d) simply establishes the conditions which must
be met before possession shall be transferred as provided in
paragraph 1(e).
2. If the court finds that paragraph 1(d) establishes a

condition to the payment of interest, does it constitute a
condition to the whole agreement being in full force and
effect or simply a condition precedent to the payment of
interest.
3. If the court finds that paragraph 1(d) is a condition
precedent to the payment of interest, has such condition
occurred and/or was such condition not material, such that
the plaintiff still has a duty to pay interest.
4. If the plaintiff still has a duty to pay interest,
for what period has such interest accrued and what amount
should be set off for the non-occurrence of a condition, if
any.
5. Does the trial court have discretion to

reimburse

a

successful litigant for expert witness fees and other trial
preparation expenses under a statute which authorizes an
award to an owner whose property is acquired in condemnation,
for "costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee...".
6. Whether such statute authorizes an award of costs and
attorney's fees incurred for this appeal.

TEXT OF AUTHORITIES
See reprint of

§ 11-19-23.9, Utah Code Ann., 1953,

attached to the Appendix hereof as Exhibit "C".

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Subsequent to the filing of this condemnation action the
plaintiff filed a Motion for Order of Immediate Occupancy,
which was Motion

opposed by the property

owners on the

grounds that the plaintiff did not need immediate possession,
and in any event lacked the power of eminent domain in this
instance.
plaintiff's

Prior

to

Motion

a

the

ruling

by

defendant

the

trial

landowners

court
and

on

other

neighboring owners not parties to this lawsuit entered into a
contract and agreement setting forth promises between the
parties for the sale of the property and/or plaintiff's
occupancy thereof prior to a change of ownership.

Such

agreement was approved by the court and entered as a pleading
herein

entitled

"Order

of

Immediate

Occupancy".

That

agreement provided for plaintiff's deposit of funds with the
clerk of the court and for interest on the amounts on deposit
to be paid to the owners. The trial court denied the owners'
motion for an award of such interest as well as for an award
of expert witness fees and other trial preparation costs
necessarily incurred, from which denial this appeal is taken.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendants, Juanita Irene Burge, Robert D. Barrows,
Jr., and Beatrice Irene Barrows (hereinafter the "owners"),
were the owners of real property located at 62, 64, and 66
East

200

South

City, Utah.

(hereinafter

the "property")

in Salt

Lake

The other defendants (hereinafter "tenants") in

this action were joined because they were tenants occupying
the property at the time of commencement of this action.
property

is

located

on

block

57

and

the

The

plaintiff,

Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, brought this action
on June 24, 1985, to condemn the total tract as part of its
redevelopment plans for the block. 1

Plaintiff then filed its

Motion for Order of Immediate Occupancy on or about August 1,
1985. 2

The

immediate

tenants

possession,3

stipulated
but

that plaintiff

the Motion was

could

have

opposed by

the

owners cis set forth in their Answer to Motion for Order of
Immediate

Occupancy, Motion

August 6, 1985. 4

and

Notice

filed

on or

The matter was set for hearing

about

on August

13, 1985, at which time the plaintiff, owners, and neighbors
who also owned land on block 57 (hereinafter "neighbors") and
their attorneys met prior to argument and entered into an
agreement which was stipulated to in open court and entered
1

Complaint (R. 2-7).

2

R. 38-40.

3

R. 71-75.

4

R. 218-225.
4

into

the

record

entitled

Order

of

Immediate

Occupancy^

(hereinafter the "Order" or "contract", a copy of which is
included

in the addendum

hereof) .

as Exhibit

"A" and made a part

It is the interpretation of the meaning of that

contract that gives rise to Point I of this appeal.
The factual background explaining plaintiff's need for
immediate occupancy was presented to the court upon proffer
at the hearing on March 25, 1987, 6 and is not in dispute
except for the interpretation of the meaning of the terms of
the Contract.7
entered

into

Prior to filing this action the plaintiff had
an

agreement

with

Lincoln

Property

Company

(hereinafter "Lincoln") to be the developer of block 57, but
Lincoln

was

development

becoming
because

less
of

interested

mounting

in

proceeding

obstacles.

Owners

with
of

property located within the South two-thirds of the block had
filed suit contesting the right and power of the plaintiff to
condemn, which action was pending before Judge Raymond Uno.
An interlocutory appeal to the Utah Supreme Court had upheld
Judge

Uno's

denial

of

plaintiff's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment, so there was still a question at the time of the
hearing

on

plaintiff's

Motion

for

Order

of

Immediate

Occupancy as to whether or not the plaintiff even had the
5

R. 230-239.

6

Transcript (R. 769-782).

7

Id. at 782-783.

36 line 16 and page 37 line 7.

5

power of condemnation of block 57 8 .
Lincoln

still

showed

some

interest

in developing

the

north one-third of the block but was not willing to proceed
with

development

plans

until

the

plaintiff

obtained

possession of the subject property and established that it
had the power of condemnation.

If these issues were not

immediately resolved Lincoln was ready to walk away from its
participation
This

would

leaving
delay

the

plaintiff

plaintiff's

without

buy-out

of

a

developer.

the

neighbors,

(represented by B. Ray Zoll) who were anxious to sell their
rapidly deteriorating parcels. 9
In order to
Distribution
"ADL"),

of

which

development
plaintiff

of
sought

induce
Land

for

would
the
an

Lincoln to sign an Agreement
Private

commit
north

Development

Lincoln

one-third

agreement

from

of
the

to

for

(hereinafter
proceed

the

with

block,

owners

to

the
give

plaintiff an option to remain open as long as 60 days to buy
the property

free of any claims or defenses that could be

raised by the owners.
contract.

The owners agreed as set forth in the

Before the contract was entered with the court in

its final form a written proposal thereof

(hereinafter the

"draft,"' a copy of which is attached to the Addendum herein
as Exhibit "B") was prepared by plaintiff's attorney,

Harold

A. Hintze, and submitted to the owners' attorney, John T.
8

R. 25.

9

R. 25-28, 36-37.
6

Evans, who made modifications thereof that were incorporated
into the final written contract. 10

That contract was then

signed on behalf of the parties thereto by their attorneys or
legal representatives, and entered

by the court on August

16, 1985, entitled "Order of Immediate Occupancy" 11 .
At the time of entry of the Order of Immediate Occupancy
funds

in

the

amount

of

$275,220.00

were

deposited

by

plaintiff with the clerk as agreed, which were invested by
the clerk earning interest at the highest rate available for
federally insured accounts. 12
On August 22, 1985, the defendant tenants filed their
Objection to the Order of Immediate Occupancy asserting a
right to such funds on deposit and objecting to paragraph
three of the Order excluding the tenants from sharing in the
funds. 13

That objection was heard by the court on November

1, 1985, at which time the court ordered that such funds be
frozen and not be distributed to any of the defendants until
further order of the court, thereby denying the owners the
right to withdraw such funds or any portion thereof contrary
to the provisions of the contract. 14
The issue as to the tenants7 right to share in the just
10

R. 613-624.

11

R. 231-239. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A".

12

Order an Post Trial Motions f 5 and 6 (R. 550-552)

13

R. 234-245.

14

Order on Post-Trial Motions f 5 and 6 (R. 550-552)
7

compensation proceeds came on for trial on February 10, 1987,
at which the court denied the tenants' claim to the proceeds
on file with the clerk or any other amount constituting just
compensation for the taking of the property. 15

The amount of

just compensation was then determined by jury trial on the
23, 24, and 25 of February, 1987, 1 6 and on March 15, 1987,
the owners moved the court to lift the stay that was freezing
the funds and to enter its order that such sums on deposit
with the clerk

including

accrued

interest be paid to the

owners, 17 This motion was denied and the court ordered the
whole thereof to be returned to the plaintiff. 18

Inasmuch as

the owners did not withdraw any funds on deposit and Lincoln
did not enter into its ADL agreement with the plaintiff as
provided

in the

contract, 19

the plaintiff

did not

obtain

possession of the property until June 7, 1987, when it paid
the owners the amount of $305,800.00 awarded by the jury as
just compensation, plus attorney's

fees of

$10,933.00 and

court costs amounting to the sum of $332.70 plus interest on
the amount of Judgement
$833.05. 20

from date of entry in the sum of

The highest amount which had been offered by the

15

R. 546.

16

R. 324-325.

17

R. 478.

18

Order on Post-Trial Motion f 6. (R. 552).

19

Id. at f 5 (R. 551).

20

R. 558-562.

plaintiff prior to filing this action was in the sum of
$273,000.00,21 hence the amount of the award exceeded the
amount offered.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Interest accruing from the date of deposit of funds held
by the clerk is due and owing from the plaintiff to the
owners because paragraph
Occupancy so provides.

1(a) of the Order of Immediate
Paragraph 1(d) did not cause the

whole Order to become void and fail because it did not
constitute a condition for the whole Order to take effect.
It merely clarified what acts would trigger the transfer of
occupancy provided for in paragraph 1(e).
Any ambiguity in the language of the Order is clarified
by the intention of the parties as shown from the fact that
the proposed

draft

of

the Order

deleted

a phrase that

provided the Order would become "null and void" if possession
were

not

transferred.

Also

it would

be

difficult

to

harmonize all the provisions of the Order if the contract
were interpreted as being "void" in that the parties had
bound

themselves

by

mutual

promises,

the

plaintiff

had

already received full performance from the owners, and the
owners

had

plaintiff

already
another

received
evidence

part
that

performance
possession

from

was

not

the
a

condition was that there was no correlation in the Order

Exhibit B attached to Complaint; affidavit of
Chitwood. (R. 9, 42-43, 51]j.
Q

between the time period for the running of interest and the
plaintiffs time of possession.
Even if paragraph 1(d) were held to have required the
transfer of possession as a condition to the owners receiving
interest the plaintiff still has a duty to make such payment
because they have in fact obtained possession in a timely
manner, and in any event any requirement that possession be
transferred as a condition for payment was not material to
the plaintiffs duty to pay interest.
In addition

to an award

of

interest owners are also

seeking reimbursement for their expert witness fees and other
trial preparation costs, and for attorney's fees incurred in
connection with this appeal pursuant to § 11-19-23.9 Utah
Code Ann., 1953.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE OWNERS7
MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF INTEREST ACCRUING ON
THE AMOUNT ON DEPOSIT WITH THE COURT AS
PROVIDED IN THE ORDER OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY
STIPULATED TO BY THE PARTIES
The Order of Immediate Occupancy is a contract, 22 It was
reduced to writing, signed by the parties thereto or their
legal representatives, approved by the court, and is binding
upon the participants, who were parties to this law-suit and
22

"A contract is a promise or set of promises for the
breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the
performances of which the law in some way recognizes
as a duty." Restatement (Second) of Contracts f 1
(1981).
10

non-parties alike.

The title "Order of Immediate Occupancy"

is really a misnomer. The document is actually a contract for
sale and conditional occupancy, not immediate occupancy.
B. Ray Zoll, attorney at law, represented the neighbors
who were not parties to this law-suit but were bound by the
contract.
action,

The defendant tenants, although parties to this
were

previously

not

parties

entered

into

to

the

contract.

They

had

their

own

Stipulation

with

the

plaintiff for an Order of Immediate Occupancy and were not in
attendance

at

the

hearing

on

August

13,

1985

when

the

agreement was entered into by the parties and approved by the
court. 23

The

terms

of

the

contract

do

not

resemble

plaintiff's Motion for Order of Immediate Occupancy 24 and the
contract provisions are not consistent with those of § 78-349 Utah Code Ann. 1953.
The contract is in the nature of an option 25 for the
purchase of real property in that it gives the plaintiff the
right to purchase the property within 60 days free and clear
of any defenses that could be raised by the owners denying
plaintiff's

power

possession.

But

of
it

eminent

was

not

domain

or

a unilateral

its

need

for

contract.

In

consideration for the owners' promise to sell the plaintiff
also promised to do the following:
23

R. 232.

24

R. 38-40.

25

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 87 (1981).
n

I- Fair market value.

Plaintiff promised to purchase

the subject property in the amount of such sum as a jury
verdict would determine to be the fair market value thereof.
II- Additional compensation.
verdict

plaintiff

additional

sum

of

promised

to

In addition to the jury

pay

for the property

$76,450.00, the payment

the

of which was

conditional upon the ADL being signed within thirty days. The
neighbors agreed to reimburse the plaintiff the full amount
of $76,450.00 by it authorizing the plaintiff to withhold
that

amount

parcels.26

from plaintiff's purchase

of the neighbor's

The ADL was never executed hence the $76,450.00

was nev€*r paid to the owners so neither the purchase of the
property

nor

the

transfer

of

its

possession

were

ever

triggered by this event.27
III- Deposit with court. Plaintiff promised to deposit
with the clerk of the court upon entry of the Order of
Immediate Occupancy, 100% of its approved appraisal being the
sum of $275,220.00, which amount or any part thereof could be
withdrawn by the owners at any time upon demand.28

Such sum

was deposited on or about August 16, 1985, and remained on
deposit

until

including

after

interest

the

trail

earned

court

thereon

ordered
returned

such

sums

to

the

26

Order of Immediate Occupancy % 1(b) (R. 234-235).

27

R. 551.

28

Order of Immediate Occupancy % 1(a). (R. 233-234).

12

plaintiff.29
IV- Interest on the amount on deposit.

The plaintiff

promised to pay interest to begin accruing from the date of
deposit of the $275,220.00 for a period not to exceed three
years at a rate of 11 1/2% per annum on such sums remaining
on deposit during that period. 30

It is the trial court's

refusal to award this interest to the owners that gives cause
for Point I of this appeal.
The owners filed their Motion to Amend Judgment on March
15,

1987, seeking

an

order

lifting

the

stay

against

the

owners from withdrawing the funds on deposit with the clerk,
and for an award of interest as provided in paragraph 1(a) of
the Contract. 31

The court denied the Motion as set forth in

its Order on Post-Trial Motions dated May 28, 1987, ordering
instead

that

the

deposited

funds

thereon be returned to plaintiff.
denying
interest

the

owners' Motion

was

possession

of

to

be

accrued

interest

The court stated it was

"because the awarding

conditional

defendants7

plus

upon

property".

plaintiff
But

of such
obtaining

then

citing

paragraph 1(d) of the Order the court went even further by
stating

that

not

just

the

payment

of

interest

was

conditional, but that the whole contract taking effect was
conditional on plaintiff receiving possession, and since the
29

R. 551-552.

30

R. 233-234.

31

R. 476-479.
1 "*

plaintiff did not obtain possession, the whole "Order of
Immediate Occupancy fails"32.

It is this ruling by the trial

court that the owners contend to be in error.
With this appeal the owners seek to have the Supreme
Court interpret the provisions of the contract pertaining to
the award of interest due and owing to the owners.
"(i)nterpretation

Since the

of a written contract is ordinarily a

question of law, ...this Court need not defer to the trial
court's construction

(citation omitted), but (may)... make

its own independent interpretation of the contract terms."33
And

where

questions

arise

in

the

interpretation

of

an

agreement, the first source of inquiry is within the document
itself.

It should be looked at in its entirety and in

accordance with its purpose, and all of its parts should be
given effect insofar as that is possible.34
A.

Period interest accrues. The interest to be paid is

that interest on deposited funds accruing at the rate of 11
1/2% per annum beginning from the date of deposit with the
court without regard to when possession is transferred, and
continuing for up to three years as provided in paragraph
1(a) of the Contract as follows:
32

R. 551.

33

Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980).
also Bradshaw v. Burningham, 671 P.2d 196, 198
(Utah 1983).

34

Larrabee v. Royal Dairy Products Co., 614, P.2d
160, 163 (Utah 1980); Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 203(a) (1981).
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See

(a)
Plaintiff shall pay into the Clerk of the
Court upon the signing of this Order of Immediate
Occupancy the sum of $275,220.00, being 100% of the
appraised value of the subject property based upon
a written appraisal obtained by plaintiff. While
retained by the Clerk of the Court, said funds
shall be invested by the Clerk at the highest
interest rate available for federally insured
accounts.
The plaintiff, however, agrees and
warrants that said funds will earn interest at an
effective rate of 11.5 annual percentage rate for
the term of which they are held by the Clerk of the
Court, not to exceed a period of three years from
the date of the Order of Immediate Occupancy and
that any shortfall or difference between the actual
interest earned by virtue of the Clerks investment
and the 11.5 annual percentage rate shall be paid
by the plaintiff to the defendants Burge, Barrows
and Barrows upon demand as herein provided. While
said funds are on deposit with the Clerk of the
Court, all or any part of said funds may be
withdrawn hereafter at the option of defendants
Burge, Barrows and Barrows, or any of them, upon a
written demand of Burge, Barrows and Barrows or
their counsel of record. The withdrawal of all or
any part of said deposited funds by defendants
Burge, Barrows and Barrows shall constitute a
waiver of any and all defenses to the taking by
condemnation of the subject property as provided in
Section 78-34-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, except the issue of just compensation
which shall then be the sole issue reserved for
trial, (emphasis added)
The

paragraph

deposited funds.

discusses

the

effect

of

withdrawing

Withdrawal "constitute(s) a waiver of any

and all defenses to the taking," but it does not say that
possession is a condition for interest to begin accruing.
Interest begins accruing from the date of deposit,35 and it
was never contemplated
on that date

that possession would be transferred

or the owners would have simply agreed to

"Said funds will earn interest... for the term of
which they are held by the clerk of the court."
iR

immediate possession effective upon entry of the Order as
sought by plaintiff in its Motion for Order of Immediate
Occupancy.

Funds were deposited with the clerk to be left

until the owners decided to withdraw the deposited amount,
and the owners earned interest thereon from date of deposit
even though the owners retained possession and continued to
collect rent during the same period.
For example, had there been no freeze of funds and the
owners had presented a written request to the clerk 3 0 days
after deposit for withdrawal of all the funds being held by
the clerk

including

interest earned from investment, the

clerk would have paid such under the contract, even though
the

interest

had

accruing

plaintiff had possession.

during

the period

before the

Nowhere is the clerk told he

should first try to determine whether possession had changed
and whether any interest should be prorated.
There is simply no connection between the transfer of
possession and the date interest begins accruing, so whenever
this court determines that payment of that interest was due
it would be payable in an amount that had accrued during the
period the owners still held possession of the premises.

If

interest were not intended to begin running until the date of
withdrawal of the funds or the date the plaintiff otherwise
receives possession the contract would not provide for the
earning of interest from date of deposit. The funds in fact
were earning interest from the clerk's investment thereof and
16

the plaintiff was required to make up the "difference between
the actual interest earned by virtue of the clerks investment
and the 11.5 annual percentage rate "for the same period.
The main issue before this court then goes to the question
discussed hereafter as to what event is required to trigger
the payment of this accrued interest.
B.

Payment of accrued interest is due and payable upon

demand.

This

Court

is

being

asked

to

harmonize

the

provisions of the contract so as to determine what event is
required to trigger the payment of the interest that has been
accruing

from

paragraph

deposit.

It

is

plaintiff's

position

1(d) prevents the owners from receiving

that

interest

until they withdrew all or part of the funds on deposit,
since

the

act

of

withdrawal

would

cause

possession

to

immediately vest in plaintiff and possession is a condition
to the owners receiving interest.
that

interest

irregardless

was
of

due

and

whether

It is the owners position

payable

the

anytime

plaintiff

took

upon

demand

possession

because, (1) the transfer of possession was not a condition
to the right to receive interest as provided in paragraph
1(a); but that, (2) if this Court determines that possession
was a condition of receiving interest plaintiff still has a
duty to pay because (a) any requirement of possession was met
when plaintiff received possession in a timely manner, and
(b) when the plaintiff's right to take possession expired
after

60

days,

possession

ceased
17

to

become

a

material

condition to the contract.
(1)

Paragraph

1(a)

shows

there

is

no

relationship

between the payment of interest and the taking of possession
because interest can be withdrawn without requiring giving up
possession.

It states that possession will be transferred

when the owners withdraw the deposited sum of $275,220.00,
not when they withdraw the interest earned thereon. 36

Had

possession

the

been

a

condition

for

interest

payments

contract would have provided for the transfer of possession
upon the withdrawal of interest.

The intent to pay interest

without transferring possession is also indicated by the fact
that

the

period

interest

accrues

possession would transfer 37 .

bears

no

relation

when

Interest begins running from

the date of deposit for as long as three years, whereas no
time was established for the withdrawal of either principal
or

interest.

intended

that

In view of the
interest

were

possession was transferred

foregoing

not

if plaintiff

to have

been

paid

had

until

it should have been clearly

so

stated, and as the drafter of the Order its provisions should

Referring to the deposited amount of $275,220.00
paragraph 1(a) states, "the withdrawal of all or any
part of said deposited funds by... (owners) shall
constitute a waiver of any and all defenses to the
taking...." Paragraph 1(e) likewise states that the
plaintiff may not begin "collecting rent... until
the owners "have... withdrawn part or all of the
$275,220.00 deposited with the clerk...."
See topic (A) above for discussion.
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be construed against the plaintiff.-38
But the trial court held that interest was not payable
on demand because paragraph 1(a) "fails" along with the rest
of the contract, for the reason that paragraph 1(d) sets up a
condition for the whole contract taking effect.

This would

have to mean that the right to take possession, and not the
right

to

exercise

consideration

the

owners

60

day

option,

was

the

for the whole contract, and that plaintiff's

promise to pay interest was simply an offer that the owners
could

only

accept

upon

relinquishing

possession

as

a

condition of acceptance, without which there is no agreement
and the whole Order is void and of no effect.
The owners' position is that paragraph 1(d) sets forth
the

conditions

of

plaintiff

taking

possession,

and

not

conditions for the whole contract to be in force and effect,
for the following reasons:
(a) Modifies grant of occupancy.
contract

authorizes

possession

of

said

provisions herein."

the

plaintiff

property...subject

Paragraph 1(e) of the
"to
to

take
the

immediate
terms

and

Such terms and provisions are set forth

in paragraph 1(d) to clarify for the protection of the owners
that before the plaintiff can take possession the owners must
first have received either the $76,450.00 or have withdrawn
all or part of the $275,220.00, as follows:

Bryant v. Desert News Publishing Co., 120 Utah 241,
233 P.2d 355 (1951).
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(d) This Order of Occupancy shall not be effective
unless or until, (1) the ADL is signed by Lincoln
Property and the Redevelopment Agency within thirty
(30) days from date hereof, and the sum of
$76,450.00 above provided has been paid pursuant to
the terms and provisions herein, or (2) the
defendant land owners have withdrawn all or part of
the $275,220.00 deposited with the Clerk of the
Court as herein provided.
The first two lines of paragraph 1(d) can be restated as
follows:
"The Order in paragraph 1(e) granting the plaintiff
possession and occupancy will not take effect until
the following conditions are met, (1) the ADL is
signed by Lincoln...."
In otherwords paragraph 1(d) did not refer to the
payment of interest as provided in paragraph 1(a) because
paragraph 1(a) had already been in effect beginning with its
entry on August 16, 1985.

Paragraph 1(d) set forth a

condition of possession, not a condition that would void the
whole contract.
(b)clear

Proposed "draft" revisions.

the

court

should

"determine

Where a contract is

the

intention

parties from the four corners of the instrument."39

of

the

But if a

contract is not clear the courts may look not only to the
language* but to the intention of the parties ascertained from
the purpose the parties had in making the agreement, 40 the
course of performance and dealing between the parties, 41 and
Oregon Railroad Company v.Idaho Stock Yards Company,
12 Utah 2d 205, 364 P.2d 826, 827 (1961).
Anderson v. Great Eastern Casualty Company 168 Pac.
966, 968 (Utah 1917).
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202 (1981).
20

the surrounding circumstances.42
that

the

"void"

parties

intended

the

One of the best evidences
contract

would

not

become

is the elimination by the parties of just such a

provision

at

the time

the

initial

proposed

draft

of

the

contract was revised.
Plaintiff prepared a proposed "draft" of the contract
which

set

forth

exactly

the

terms

and

conditions

it now

contends the final executed contract stands for, ie, that if
possession were not given to the plaintiff the whole contract
became

"null

and

void"

and

declared

plaintiff could have its deposit returned.
that

proposed

draft 43

"vacated"

so

the

Paragraph 1(d) of

(which was not executed)

stated

as

follows:
(d) If the ADL is not signed by Lincoln Property and/or
the Redevelopment Agency within thirty (30) days from
date hereof, or the defendant land owners have not
withdrawn all or part of the $275,220.00 deposited with
the Clerk of the Court as herein provided, or if the sum
of $76,450.00 above provided has not been paid pursuant
to the terms and provisions herein, then this Order of
Immediate Occupancy is null and void and upon Motion of
42

43

"It is a fundamental rule that in the construction
of Contracts the courts may look not only to the
language employed, but to the subject-matter and
the
surrounding
circumstances....
(Citation
omitted) To ascertain the intention, regard must be
had to the nature of the instrument itself, the
condition of the parties executing it, and the
objects they had in view. The words employed, if
capable of more than one meaning, are to be given
that meaning which it is apparent the parties
intended them to have." Kintner v. Harr, 146 Mont.
461, 408 P.2d 487, 494 (1965).
(Cited with
approval in Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt
Lake City, 63 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 44-45 (1987)).
See Appendix Exhibit "B"; R. 613-624.
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either of the parties, said Order of Immediate Occupancy
may be vacated upon a showing that the terms and
provisions herein have not been complied with.
The

function

consequence

of

paragraph

1(d)

is

to

explain

the

if neither the ADL is signed nor the owners

withdraw any of the deposited funds.

The proposed draft

stated that if neither of these events occur "this Order of
Immediate Occupancy is null and void."

The final executed

contract stated that if neither of these events occurred
"this Order of Occupancy shall not be effective," meaning the
granting of occupancy set forth in paragraph 1(e) shall not
take effect.
if

is significant that in the final contract document

reference to the contract being "null and void" are stricken,
and that instead of referring to the whole document by name
("Order

of

Immediate

Occupancy")

as

no

longer

being

"effective", that was changed to read that the "Order of
Occupancy shall not be effective", meaning that the portion
of the contract ordering possession and occupancy (paragraph
1(e) shall not take effect.
It is also significant that the proposed draft provided
that the "Order of Immediate Occupancy may be vacated,"
implying the funds could be returned to the plaintiff.
provision

was

stricken

from

the

final

contract

This

and the

deposited funds remained on deposit with the clerk almost two
years with the plaintiff making no effort to obtain the
return of either principal or accrued interest.
22

Even after

expiration

of

the

initial

sixty

day

option period when

plaintiff no longer needed immediate possession plaintiff
understood it was still bound by contract to leave those
funds earning interest on deposit.
It is also significant that the revision of the proposed
draft eliminated any possible time limit by which the owners
were required to withdraw the funds.

The proposed draft

could have possibly been construed as requiring the owners to
withdraw the money before the expiration of sixty days in
order to avoid having the Order declared "void" or "vacated".
But with the removal of those references there remained no
indication of any intention to limit the time within which
the owners could withdraw the funds, and that is why the
plaintiff did not ask for the return of the funds.

It was

committed to leaving them earning interest for up to three
years and could not unilaterally decide to terminate the
accrual of that interest.
(c)

Incongruous results.

Inconsistent results would

follow plaintiffs interpretation that the agreement is void,
in that, (i) the parties were already bound by the provisions
of the contract,

(ii) part performance of the agreement had

already occurred, (iii) the plaintiff had already received
the consideration from the owners for the payment of the
interest,

(iv)

any

time

requirement

for

withdrawal

was

omitted, and because of, (v) conduct of plaintiff.
(i)

Parties were already bound by the contract.
23

The

owners

were

period,

and

purchase

the

committed

to

had

plaintiff

the

property

and

sell

during

paid

the

exercised
the

60

day

option

to

$76,450.00 payment

as

required the owners would have to convey.

its

option

It is not a matter

of there being no contract in effect unless possession is
given.

The owners gave their promise and the contract was

binding upon them.
(ii)

Part performance had already occurred.

The Order

was obviously not void because from date of entry it required
the owner to give a 60 day option, 44 the plaintiff to deposit
with the clerk 100 percent of the approved appraisal 45 and to
submit the ADL to Lincoln within ten days to be signed 46 , and
clerk to invest the money on deposit, 47 all of which were
performed.

These were

requirements

of a valid

contract,

without which the plaintiff would not have left the funds on
deposit discussed above.
(iii)

Consideration

already

received:

Although the

plaintiff did not exercise its right to purchase it received
what it bargained for, i.e., an option to remain open up to
60 days to purchase free and clear of any claims or defenses
the

owner

could

assert.

44

1(b) of Order.

45

Id. 1 1(a).

46

Id. K 1(b).

47

Id. 1 1(a).

After
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approximately

October 16,

1985,48 the plaintiff had received the benefit of the owners'
promise to sell, which is one reason paragraph 1(a) allows
the

owners

possession

to

withdraw

being

interest

transferred.

at

any

The

time

option

without
was

the

consideration for the payment of interest, not possession.
But plaintiff argues that since it did not exercise its
option the whole agreement is void and the parties go back to
their original position as though there had been no contract
obligating plaintiff to fulfill its promises to pay interest.
It is analogous to paying cash for a sixty day option to buy
Blackacre, and after failing to exercise the option asking
for the cash back.
The

payment

consideration

the

promise to sell.

of

interest

plaintiff

was

was

the

to pay

only

significant

for the owners'

The additional $76,450.00 to be paid was a

contribution by the neighbors and did not come out of the
plaintiff's

pocket.49

Depositing

100% of

the

approved

appraisal was of no particular value to the owners if no
interest was running on it, and deposits in such amounts are
routinely made by condemning agencies because that much is
almost always recovered at trial.

And even most of the

interest due was earned from the clerk's investments, and the
plaintiff now wants that interest earned on the money the
owners were to receive as payment for their property being
48

Sixty days after entry of the Order.

49

U 1(c) of Order.
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taken.

The contract makes

$76,450.00

is

conditioned

it clear that payment
upon

possession

being

of

the

given. 50

Nowhere does it state such a condition for interest payment
however.
(iv)

Correlation between possession

lacking.

Were

it

intended

that

and

interest is

possession

was

a

consideration for the payment of interest there would be some
relationship between the time of possession held by plaintiff
and

the

amount

of

interest

to

be

paid.

Had

plaintiff

intended that interest payment be an incentive for the owners
to give up possession the amount of interest would decrease
the longer it took before possession was given.

This is the

reason why in a normal condemnation case where possession is
awarded pursuant to § 78-34-9 Utah Code Ann., 1953, interest
begins accruing only from the time plaintiff takes possession
and only on so much of the just compensation not already
deposited with the clerk and only for the period ending upon
entry of the Final Order of Condemnation.
But

the

instant

contract

is not

simply

Immediate Occupancy pursuant to § 78-34-9.
option

contract

interest
normally

and that

to begin

running

would.

This

consideration

to be given

is why
from

Order

date

of possession
also

of

It is also an

it does not provide

contract

provides

as

for
it
for

for the option promised by the

owners, and that consideration
50

an

is interest running on the

Id. t 1(b).
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amount on deposit
silent

as

to

from date of deposit.

any

time

requirement

The contract is

for

the

transfer

possession as a condition for interest to run.

The payment

of interest may run as long as three years.
incentive

of

It offers no

for the owners to transfer possession.

To the

contrary the incentive is to leave the funds on deposit which
acted as a savings account earning a higher rate of interest
than normal.
Imposing any type of time deadline for the withdrawal of
those funds where none exists in the contract would lead to
an

unconscionable

parties.

For

forfeiture

this

reason

not
any

intended
doubt

as

by

any

of

the

to

whether

the

withdrawal of funds from the clerk is a condition to the
payment

of

owners. 51

interest
Justice

should
would

be

not

resolved
be

in

furthered

favor
by

of

the

the

harsh

forfeiture of interest that had accrued for a considerable
time if some vague withdrawal deadline passed without notice
being first given to the owners.

Obviously, had the contract

clearly provided for any such deadline for the withdrawal of
funds before forfeiture the owners would have done everything
possible to protect the recovery of that interest.
51

And the

In resolving doubts as to whether an event
(withdrawal of funds) is made a condition of an
obligor's duty (to pay interest), and as to the
nature of such an event, an interpretation is
preferred that will reduce the obligee's (owners')
risk of forfeiture unless the event is within the
obligee's control or the circumstances indicate
that he has assumed the risk. Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 227(1) (1981).
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reverse of that situation makes it obvious that interest was
not a quid pro quo of possession

in that had the owners

withdrawn the interest one week prior to the deadline for the
conveying of possession, receipt of a large sum would not
represent the value of one weeks occupancy of the property.
It becomes obvious that the interest running from the date of
deposit

was

consideration

for

the

option

and

not

for

plaintiffs use of the property.
(v)

Conduct of Plaintiff.

Plaintiff understood that

the owners7 failure to withdraw any funds on deposit did not
void the contract or it would not have left the funds with
the clerk for almost two years without seeking there return.
Not

until

the

owners

asked

permission

of

the

court

to

withdraw the funds 52 did the plaintiff deny the owners' right
thereto.

Had plaintiff obtained possession by exercising its

option within 60 days there is little doubt that the interest
earning during that period would have been paid to the owners
"upon demand" even though earned prior to the transfer of
possession.

Plaintiff cannot now deny its duty to pay just

because the plaintiff chose not to exercise its option.
neighbors

would

have

still

contributed

bought out immediately by the plaintiff.

$76,450.00

to

The
be

Just because the

plaintiff chose not to exercise its option and obtain the
possession as contemplated does not mean it can deny its duty
to pay interest almost two years later.
52

R. 478.
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If plaintiff had

honestly intended that interest would not be payable unless
possession

had

been

transferred,

plaintiff's

draft

paragraph 1(d) should have specifically so stated.
omission

is

a

agreement, and
parties.

glaring
certainly

No where

defect

in

enough

the

Such
of

the

so to have mislead

the

does paragraph

drafting

of

1(d) state that the

contract would be "void", "vacated", or that interest shall
be "in lieu of possession", or "in lieu of rent".

Paragraph

1(a), however, is clear that interest begins running from
deposit and is payable upon demand.

A clear paragraph should

prevail over a vague one.
(2)

If possession is a condition.

Even if the transfer

of possession to the plaintiff were a condition which must
occur before the plaintiff has a duty to pay interest the
plaintiff's duty is not discharged and interest is now due
and owing because (a) the transfer of possession has in fact
occurred in a timely manner, and (b) even if the transfer of
possession to the plaintiff was not timely such transfer of
possession was not a material condition to the payment of
interest, hence plaintiff's obligation to pay interest should
be enforced.
(a)
possession

Condition
to

the

occurred.

Even if the transfer of

plaintiff

was

a

condition

of

the

plaintiff's duty to pay interest, that condition was fully
satisfied

in that,

(i) actual possession of the subject

property has been received by the plaintiff, and (ii) the
29

possession was received in a timely manner.
(i)the

Actual possession received by plaintiff.

expiration

of

the

sixty

day

option

After

for plaintiff

acquire the property it could still obtain possession.

to
It

was not helpless to sit around forever to obtain occupancy.
It could file another Motion for Order of Immediate Occupancy
if it were then able to satisfy the requirements of § 78-34-9
Utah

Code Ann.,

1953.

It

could

wait

for the owners to

withdraw of any portion of the sums deposited with the clerk.
The owners formally elected to do this by filing their Motion
to Amend Judgement on March 15, 1987 seeking to have the
freeze on the funds lifted and an order that such sums on
deposit be paid to the owners, but such tender of possession
was opposed by the plaintiff and the court denied the owners
the right to withdraw any such funds or the interest accrued
thereon.

It could seek an expedited trial setting to obtain

a Final Order of Condemnation conveying title and possession,
or it could wait for the regular trial setting which in fact
is what occurred
jury determined

on February 23, 1987, at which time the
the amount of just compensation which was

paid by the plaintiff on June 7, 1987, at which time a Final
Order

of

Condemnation

was

entered,

thereby

transferring

possession.
(ii)-

Timeliness

of

possession.

The

tender

of

possession and its transfer occurred in a timely manner.

In

fact the* best evidence that possession was not a condition is
30

the fact there simply was no time limit in the Order by which
possession must be transferred before interest is payable.
It certainly was not contemplated that the owners would give
possession by withdrawing funds during the first sixty days
or the plaintiff would have no incentive to expedite the
signing

of

$76,450.00.

the

ADL

and

the

payment

to

the

owners

of

They would have no reason to pay that money if

they already had possession.

As far as how long the owners

had to leave the funds on deposit it would seem that up to
three years was contemplated, because that's how long the
plaintiff agreed to pay interest on the funds remaining on
deposit.53
Even if one adopts the plaintiff's position that the
whole contract was void without the transfer of possession
(the withdrawal of funds being a condition of acceptance of
plaintiff's offer to pay
never

revoked

without

and

requesting

interest) plaintiff's offer was

in fact leaving the funds on deposit
their

return,

manifested

intention that its offer remain open.

plaintiff's

Not until the owners

requested court permission to withdraw the funds did the
plaintiff seek their return.

The owners relied on the fact

that those funds remained on deposit earning interest during
that period and by allowing that to happen plaintiff should
be estopped from now asserting that its offer to pay interest
had been withdrawn.
53

f 1(a) of the Order.
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(b)

Possession

not a material

condition.

As noted

above at paragraph B(l) if possession is a condition of the
payment

of

contract

interest

taking

it

is not

a condition

effect.

There

was

already

to

the

an

whole

agreement

binding upon the parties to do certain things which already
had

been

performed

pursuant

to

mutual

promises.

Any

requirement to transfer possession would simply constitute a
condition precedent to the payment of interest becoming due
as a requirement of a valid contract.

However, the

non-occurrence

does

plaintiff

of

of
its

such

a

condition

obligation

to

pay

not

interest

relieve

the

where

the

condition is only incidental to the agreement, 54 and this is
especially true where the non-occurrence of a condition is
due to impossibility.55

In this case the impossibility was

due to the court's freezing of the funds on deposit over
which the owners had no control, in which case any doubt as
to whether the withdrawal of funds was a material condition
should be construed in favor of the owners. 56
Since the plaintiff would be obligated to pay interest
if

the

whether

condition
the

were

plaintiff's

not

material

failure

the

to have

question

becomes

possession

(from

whatever time the court determines possession was to have
54

Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 237.

55

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 230(2)(b);
6 Corbin on Contracts § 13 62 (1962).

56

Restatement (Second) of Contract § 227.
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been given to the time plaintiff took possession on June 7,
1987,) was a material breach of the contract such that
plaintiff's promise to pay interest should not be enforced.
As

discussed

hereafter

is the owners7

it

position that

failure to withdraw the funds on deposit is not material

the

non-occurrence does not put the plaintiff "to a disadvantage
or adversely effects his rights,"57

that the plaintiff can

be compensated for being deprived of possession by giving
credit for rents it would have received, the harm suffered by
the owners would be great if a forfeiture of all the interest
was allowed to take place, the plaintiff has now obtained
possession

of

the property

and therefore

any

such non-

performance has been cured, the fact that the owners have
acted in good faith,58 and the fact that the withdrawing of
funds beyond their control.59
The

bargained

for

consideration

required

by

the

plaintiff was the owners' promise to convey the property
within sixty days at a time when the whole redevelopment
future of block 57 seemed to be hanging in the balance.
After that, possession was incidental.

Plaintiff had lost

its developer and all it was going to do was evict the
tenants and tear down the building, so it would not have even
57

Utah State Building Board v. Walsh Plumbing Co., 399
P.2d 141, 144, 16 Utah 2d 249 (1965).

58

Restatement (Second) Contract § 241.

59

Restatement (Second) Contracts § 230(2) (b).
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had the benefit of rents that the owners received.
did

not

ask

the

owners

for possession

Plaintiff

even though the

neighbors remained anxious to be bought out and would no
doubt have still contributed funds to bring expedite purchase
of their land.
Even

after

Plaintiff did not seek an early trial date.

just

compensation

was

determined

at

trial

plaintiff waited over three months to file it's Final Order
of Condemnation and obtain possession.

It asked for at least

six months after the Final Order was entered in which to raze
the buildings on the property60 even though it already had
the tenants stipulation for immediate occupancy,61 and when
the defendant filed it's motion to withdraw funds thereby
automatically

transferring

possession,

such

motion

was

opposed by plaintiff.62
Not having possession did not prejudice the plaintiff
because the funds on deposit with the clerk continued to earn
interest from investment that would reduce the total interest
owing by the plaintiff, and the total payment owing from the
plaintiff is still less than the additional $76,450.00 it
would have been had the ADL been signed.

The plaintiff

received the benefit of the owners' option which was the
primary consideration it needed, it had no developer that had
any interest in the property.
60

R. 553.

61

R. 71-75.

62

R. 787-788.
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Whatever prejudice has been caused plaintiff is it's own
fault.

It allowed the funds to remain with the clerk for

almost two years without seeking their return.

Plaintiff

could have asked the court to allow a bond to be placed in
lieu of funds on deposit pursuant to § 78-34-16, Utah Code
Ann., 1953.
making

It

created a distressed situation with block 57

it impossible to sell, improve, or keep suitable

tenants on the premises.

For two years the plaintiff watched

the owners collect rents in an amount much less than the
owners could have received in interest, all the time allowing
the funds on deposit to remain invested by the clerk and
thereby misleading the owners into thinking that the owners
were entitled to the interest being earned.

Plaintiff had a

duty to come forward and ask for it's money back if it did
not think the money belonged to anyone else, and by failing
to do so waves it right to later asserting a claim thereto.63
The plaintiff could have obtained possession any time it
wanted

by

buying

the

neighbor's

land

and

giving

defendants $76,450.00 even though no ADL was signed.

the
The

neighbors had no reason to care whether the ADL was signed or
a developer was going ahead.

They simply wanted to be bought

out immediately from property that was rapidly deteriorating.
As it turned out plaintiff did in fact purchase properties
from

the
63

neighbors before

obtaining

possession

from the

See 17 Am Jur 2d Contracts § 9 nt 6, stating a
plaintiff can be estopped by conduct from denying a
provision in a contract.
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owners of the subject property or otherwise notifying them of
that purchase.
The owners have acted in good faith at all times. After
it became clear that plaintiff had no developers for the
property in the immediate future, the owners were anxious to
transfer possession.

Following the ruling from Judge Raymond

Uno to the effect that the plaintiff lacked the powers of
eminent

domain

in

acquiring

block

57, the

plaintiff's

attorney, William Oswald, advised the owners' attorney, John
T. Evans, that the plaintiff was willing to walk away from
the condemnation if the owners so desired.

At that time Mr.

Evans indicated that the owners wished to be bought out and
would

be

proceeding

toward

trial

on

the

issue of just

compensation, but obviously would not be raising a defense
against

the

plaintiff's

right

to

condemn

under

such

circumstances, nor did the owners so contest such right at
trial.

The owners were in an untenable position of being

surrounded by blighted neighborhood, unable to improve their
property or attract good tenants, tenants have no incentive
to continue to be current on their rent, yet the owners'
hands were tied due to the freezing of the money on deposit.
And

when

they

did

ask

the

trial

court

to

allow their

withdrawal of the funds, their motion was opposed by the
plaintiff and they were refused by the trial court.

Prior to

that time the owners were willing to allow matters to take
their natural course in reliance upon the Order of Immediate
36

Occupancy, assured that their money on deposit was earning
interest for them.
The

remedy

in the

event

of the

non-occurrence

of a

condition not material to the plaintiff is for the plaintiff
to be required to fulfill its duty by paying interest in full
as required under the terms of the contract less the cost of
what was not performed, which in this case would be an offset
for the benefit to the plaintiff of the net rent it would
have received

had possession been given. 64

It should be

emphasized however, that the remedy of allowing a deduction
from interest in the amount of net rents is only appropriate
in the event this court finds that possession was a condition
to the payment of interest and that such possession was not
material to the plaintiff.
the district

court

The matter should be remanded to

to determine what

interest the

owners

would be entitled to receive under the Order and what rents
should be deducted therefrom if any by way of set-off.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT IS AUTHORIZED TO MAKE AN
AWARD FOR EXPERT WITNESS FEES OR OTHER
TRIAL PREPARATION EXPENSES PURSUANT TO
§ 11-19-23.9, UTAH CODE ANN., 1953
In preparation for the jury trial held on February 23,
24,

and

25,

1987,

on

the

issue

of

just

compensation,

reasonable and necessary expenses were incurred by the owners
(in addition to attorney's fees and court costs) as fees for

6 Corbin on Contracts § 1370 (1962).
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expert consultants as follows:
a.

Ralph Fo Evans, Architect

$500.00

b.

Dean Webb, Structural Engineer

c.

John K. Bushnell, M.A.I. Appraiser

$9,000.00

d.

Robert J. Holmes, M.A.I. Appraiser

$3,912.00

e.

John C. Brown, A.S.A. Appraiser

$4,390.67

$600.00

Of the foregoing Dean Webb, John K. Bushnell, and Robert J.
Holmes were called to testify at trial as expert witnesses. 65
The owners made a motion 66 for the court make an award
of the aforementioned sums pursuant to § 11-19-23.9 Utah Code
Ann.,

1953. 6 7

This motion was denied by the court which

found that the statute "as a matter of law does not authorize
it to make an award

for other expenses

incurred

such

as

expert witness fees, notwithstanding that expert witness fees
and expenses were necessarily incurred in this matter...". 68
The statute authorizes an award for "costs, including a
reasonable

attorney's

fee

as

determined

by

the

court."

Plaintiff argued that "costs" as used in the statute referred
to "court costs" provided for in Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure 69 and the trial court interpreted its authority as
though the statute only allowed an award of "court costs and
65

R. 511-512.

66

R. 477-478.

67

See full text of Statute in Appendix Exhibit C.

68

Order On Post Trial Motions f 7 (R. 552).

69

R. 795.
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attorney's

fees".

The

owners

assert

that

the

statute

authorizes an award of expert witness fees and other trial
preparation

expenses

reasonably

and

necessarily

incurred

because this was the intention of legislature70 as determined
by, (A) the natural, commonly accepted meaning of the words
of the statute, (B) the identical expression is repeated in
the same statute, and

(C) and because of the reason and

purpose for the statute.
A. Commonly accepted meaning.

There is a presumption

that the meaning of terms in a statute should be given there
ordinary, commonly accepted meaning.71

There is nothing in

the statute that would indicate a legislative intent to limit
the meaning of "costs" to the narrow definition of "court
costs" that
Procedure.

are

taxable

under

the Utah Rules of Civil

The ordinary meaning of costs has a much broader

interpretation

that

includes

"(1) the

anything.. ., (2) loss of any kind;...
money...."72

amount...paid...for
(3) the outlay of

"Costs" can also mean "attorneys' fees" under a

70

"The primary rule of construction of statutes is to
ascertain and declare the intention of the
legislature and to carry such intention into
effect." 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes, § 145.

71

Parkinson v. State Bank, 84 Utah 278, 35 P.2d 814,
94 ALR 1112.

72

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 188 (2d ed.
1954) , defining cost pertaining to law as, "in a
general sense, expenses incurred in litigation; as;
(a) Those payable to the attorney or counsel by his
client, esp. when fixed by law; — commonly called
fees. (b) Those given by the law or the court to
the prevailing party against the loosing party. —
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statute authorizing an award for "costs as may seem equitable
and just." 73
The broad definition of "costs" is especially applicable
when followed by "including", which ordinarily is a word of
enlargement and not of limitation.

It "expands" the word

"costs" to include expenses outside the narrow definition of
"court

costs". 74

Using

other

synonyms

for

"including"

clarifies "attorney's fees" comprise part of and are included
within

the

meaning

of

"costs".

"Costs" as used

in

the

statute does not mean "court costs".
B.

Identical expressions.

Words used in one place in a

statute are presumed to have the same meaning in every other
place in the statute, especially when it is used in the same
section,
general

in the same
purpose. 75

subject matter, looking to the same
In addition to providing

for "costs,

including a reasonable attorney's fee", the same statute goes
on to authorize an award "for the costs and expenses, if any,
of relocating the owner...."

It is obvious that relocating

the owner does not involve incurring "court costs", hence the
intention of the legislature was for "costs" to indicate its
Syn. price expense, charge.
73

The Western Casualty and Surety Company v. Marchant,
615 P.2d 423, 427 (Utah, 1980).

74

Pacific Automobile Insurance Company v. Commercial
Casualty Insurance Company, 161 P.2d 423, 424 (Utah
1945).

75

Spring Canyon Coal Company v. Industrial Commission,
74 Utah 103, 277 Pac. 206.
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broader meaning in the nature of reimbursement of expenses
incurred caused by the condemnation.
C.

Purpose of statute.

Determining the purpose of a

statute is important in ascertaining legislative intent.76
The legislative concern for making sure that owners deprived
of their property are made whole without having to take a
loss is evident from the broad scope of compensation covered
by the statute:
"...(TJhe court may,...award in addition to his
just compensation, costs, including a reasonable
attorney's fee as determined by the court. The
court...may also award a reasonable sum as
compensation for the costs and expenses, if any, of
relocating the owner.... An award may also be made
for damages to any fixtures or personal property
owned by the owner of such acquired property. .. if
such fixtures or personal property are damaged as a
result of such acquisition or relocation." § 11-1923.9.
The same legislative concern to compensate condemnees
beyond the fair market value they are entitled to receive is
evident

in

court

rulings

that

have

interpreted

similar

statutes as authorizing an award for expert witness fees.77
Since the legislature intended that the owners should not
have to incur expenses for costs, moving, damage to fixtures
or attorney's fees in defending an action there is every
76

Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P.Zd
973, 126 ALR 1318.

77

Union Exploration Company v. Moffat Tunnel
Improvement District. 104 Colo. 109, 89 P.2d 257
(1939); Dade County v. Brigham, 47 So. 2d 602 (Fla.
1950), a copy of which is attached to the Appendix
hereto as Exhibit "D".
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reason to believe they did not intend that an owner should
have to

incur the expense of expert witnesses, which can

often amount to a greater expense than the attorney fees.

It

does not make sense to authorize an award for attorney's fees
so the owners can defend themselves knowing that the attorney
cannot effectively defend his client without retaining expert
witnesses.

In that sense expert witness fees are really a

part of attorney's fees in that they are part of the costs
incurred by the attorney in preparing for the trial just as
are his other out of pocket costs.
This case should be remanded to the trial court with
instruction that § 11-19-23.9 authorizes an award for expert
witness fees and other trial preparation expenses reasonably
and necessarily

incurred

and that the trial court may so

award at its discretion.
POINT III
THE OWNERS SHOULD BE TO AN AWARDED FOR COSTS
AND ATTORNEY'S FEES NECESSARILY INCURRED FOR
THIS APPEAL PURSUANT TO § 11-19-23.9, UTAH
CODE ANN., 1953
An award of attorney's fees to a condemnee is permitted
by § 11-19-23.9, Utah Code Ann., 1953. 78
have

this

Court

in

its

discretion

The owners seek to

grant

attorney's

fees

necessarily incurred for this appeal and to remand this case
to

the

District

Court

for

its

determination

Reproduced in the Appendix as Exhibit "C".
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of

such

reasonable attorney's fees and costs./y
CONCLUSION
The owner seeks to have this court reverse the trial
court's Order denying the owners Motion for an award of
interest pursuant to the provisions of the Order of Immediate
Occupancy and denying the owners' motion for an award for
expert witness fees, and that this matter be remanded to the
trial court with instructions to enter a judgement in favor
of the owners in the amount of 11 1/2% interest per annum on
the sum of $276,220.00 from August 16, 1985 to June 7, 1987,
plus interest from June 7, 1987 to August 16, 1988, on the
principal sum of $276,220.00 at the rate of 11 1/2% per annum
less the rate at which said principal would have earned funds
if fully invested at the highest rate available for federally
insured accounts.

The owners further seek to have this court

instruct the trial court that § 11-19-23.9, Utah Code Ann.,
1953, authorizes the trial court to make an award to the
owners for expert witness fees and other litigation expenses
reasonably and necessarily incurred, and that the District
Court further make a determination of reasonable attorney's
fees to be granted to the owners for the appeal of this case.

Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates,
617 P.2d 406 (Utah 1980).
A ^

Dated this 7th day of December 1987,
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING

John T. Evans Attorney for
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF
SALT LAKE CITY, a public
entity,
Plaintiff,
ORDER OF IMMEDIATE
OCCUPANCY

vs.
JUNIATA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT
G. BARROWS; BEATRICE
IRENE BARROWS; ELLEN K.
DASKALAS, an individual,
dba THE PAWN SHOP, THE PAWN
SHOP, a Utah Corporation;
JAMES ANDERSON, an individual, dba JIM'S RIBS;
TERRY PANTELAKIS, an individual, dba AAA JEWELERS
AND LOANS; and LOANS AND
SALES, INC., a Utah Corporation;
Defendants.

Civil No. C85-4017

JUDGE: Hon. Homer F,
Wilkinson

Plaintiff's Motion for an Order of Immediate
Occupancy and Defendant Burge, Barrows and Barrows'
Motion came on for a hearing pursuant to notice before
• v/.\ I

O

Court

- 2 The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Judge on
August 13, 1985 at 8:30 a.m., the plaintiff being
represented by Harold A. Hintze, Esq. and William D.
Oswald, Esq., and Michael Chitwood Executive Director of
the Salt Lake Redevelopment Agency being present, the
defendants Juniata Irene Burge, Beatrice Irene Barrows
and Robert G. Barrows being present and represented by
John T. Evans, Esq. the defendants Ellen K. Daskalas, an
individual, dba The Pawn Shop, a Utah corporation, James
Anderson, an individual, dba Jim's Ribs, Terry
Pantelakis, an individual, dba AAA Jewelers and Loans,
and Loans and Sales, Inc., a Utah corporation, neither
appearing personally nor by and through their attorney
of record Jerome Moody, Esq., said defendants having
been served timely notice of said Motions but having
heretofore filed a Stipulation for Immediate Occupancy
which is on file herein, and Ray Zoll representing
himself as a property owner and as attorney for the
following land owners in Block 57, Plat "A", Salt Lake
City Survey and located at 235 South Main Street, David
Mortensen, Erv Wilfred, 235 South Main Associates, 235
South Main, Inc., Egan and Associates, and Harold Egan,
the parties and other land owners having reached an open
court stipulation which has been recited and agreed to
orally before the Court on August 13, 1985, said
Stipulation to be the basis of an Order of Immediate
Occupancy.

pOA^

- 3 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND
ADJUDGED:
1.

Plaintiff's Motion for an Order of Immediate

Occupancy of the following described property, to-wit:
Beginning at a point 166 feet west of the
northeast Corner of Lot 6, Block 57, Plat
"A", Salt Lake City Survey, and running
thence east 69 feet to the center of a 17
inch party wall and which point is further
evidenced by a metal plug inserted in the
sidewalk
north
of
said
wall
by
R.W.
Sorensen, licensed surveyor; thence south
110 feet; thence west 68 feet; thence south
55 feet; thence west 1 foot; thence north
165 feet to the point of beginning.
may be granted subject to and upon the following terms
and provisions:
(a)

Plaintiff shall pay into the Clerk of

the Court upon signing of this Order of Immediate
Occupancy the sum of $275,220.00, being 100% of the
appraised value of the subject property based upon a
written appraisal obtained by plaintiff.

While retained

by the Clerk of the Court, said funds shall be invested
by the Clerk at the highest interest rate available for
federally insured accounts.

The plaintiff, however,

agrees and warrants that said funds will earn interest
at an effective rate of 11.5 annual percentage rate for
the term of which they are held by the Clerk of the
Court, not to exceed a period of three years from the
date of the Order of Immediate Occupancy and that any

- 4 shortfall or difference between the actual interest
earned by virtue of the Clerk's investment and the 11.5
annual percentage rate shall be paid by the plaintiff to
the defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows upon demand as
herein provided. While said funds are on deposit with
the Clerk of the Court, all or any part of said funds
may be withdrawn hereafter at the option of defendants
Burge, Barrows and Barrows, or any of them, upon a
written demand of Burge, Barrows and Barrows or their
counsel of record.

The withdrawal of all or any part of

said deposited funds by defendants Burge, Barrows and
Barrows shall constitute a waiver of any and all
defenses to the taking by condemnation of the subject
property as provided in Section 78-34-9, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended, except the issue of just
compensation which shall then be the sole issue reserved
for trial.
(b)

On entry of this Order of Immediate

Occupancy, the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City
shall submit within ten (10) days of the date hereof to
Lincoln Property Company N.C., Inc. (Lincoln) for
signature an Agreement for Distribution of Land for
Private Development (ADL).

Said ADL must be fully

executed by the Redevelopment Agency and Lincoln within
thirty (30) days from date hereof.

Within thirty (30)

days from execution of the ADL by Lincoln, the

- 5 Redevelopment Agency shall pay Burge, Barrows and
Barrows $76f450.00 as hereinafter described and exercise
its option to purchase and the owners shall sell the
property located at 235 South Main Street, owned by
Mountain States Creamery Company and David Mortensen
pursuant to the written Offer to Purchase dated April 5,
1985 and the Extension Agreement extending said Offer to
sixty (60) days from date hereof.

The Redevelopment

Agency in disbursement of the purchase price for

said

Mortensen property may withhold, and Mortensen
authorizes the Redevelopment Agency to pay to and assign
to the defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows from said
funds, and solely from said funds, the sum of $76/450.00
to be paid to defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows upon
the closing of the Redevelopment Agency's acquisition of
David Mortensen's interest in the property located at
235 South Main Street, but not to exceed thirty (30)
days from the date Lincoln executes the ADL.

Said sum

of $76,450.00 shall be paid as additional compensation
over and above any just compensation ultimately found by
the court or jury in this case to be the fair market
value of the property being condemned herein and the
receipt of said funds shall not be an offset or
deduction from said just compensation and the receipt of
the same shall not be disclosed to the jury.

Upon

payment to defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows of the

- 6 sum of $76,450.00, said defendants by receipt thereof,
waive any and all defenses to the taking by condemnation
of the subject property in the same manner as would
occur by withdrawal of funds deposited with the Clerk of
the Court pursuant to the aforementioned Section
78-34-9.
(c)

David Mortensen1s obligation in

regards to the payment of the aforementioned $76,450.00
is solely conditioned upon the Redevelopment Agency's
election to exercise its right of acceptance under the
aforementioned Offer to Purchase the property at 235
South Main Street and if the fund from which this
partial assignment has been made does not come into
existence and Mortensen is not paid at least $76,450.00
or entitled to immediate payment thereof by virtue of
the fact that the Offer to Purchase is not consummated
for any reason, said Mortensen shall have absolutely no
liability to make any payments to the defendants Burge,
Barrows and Barrows by virtue of this Order.
(d)

This Order of Occupancy shall not be

effective unless or until, (1) the ADL is signed by
Lincoln Property and the Redevelopment Agency within
thirty (30) days from date hereof, and the sum of
$76,450.00 above provided has been paid pursuant to the
terms and provisions herein, or (2) the defendant land
owners have withdrawn all or part of the $275,220.00

- 7 deposited with the Clerk of the Court as herein
provided.
(e)

Based upon the terms and conditions of

the oral Stipulation made to the Court, the Court does
hereby enter an Order of Immediate Occupancy that the
subject property is sought for uses by the public in
connection with and as part of a redevelopment project
authorized and approved by the City Council of Salt Lake
City and the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, and
the plaintiff is authorized to take immediate possession
of said property and continue in possession of the same
pending further hearing and trial on the issue of just
compensation which, subject to the terms and provisions
herein, is the only issue which may be raised in this
action as provided in Section 78-34-9, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended.

Plaintiff or its agents may

do such work thereon as may be required for the purposes
for which said property is sought to be condemned
including, but not limited to, demolition of existing
improvements and construction of new improvements or
structures, without interference by defendants or any of
defendants' partners, agents, or employees, however, no
demolition of the existing building, collecting of rent,
or eviction of existing tenants pursuant to said Order
of Immediate Occupancy will occur until the defendants
have either withdrawn part or all of the $275,220.00

- 8 deposited with the Clerk of the Court as provided herein
or have received payment from David Mortensen through
the Redevelopment Agency of the $76,450.00 as herein
provided*
2.

The Redevelopment Agency stipulates to

extend the offers for purchase of the condominium
properties located at 235 South Main Street, which
include the owners represented herein by B. Ray Zoll,
for sixty (60) days from the date hereof.
3.

Defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows'

Motion in regards to the manner of disbursement of funds
to be deposited with the Clerk as above described came
on for a hearing and no one appearing in opposition
thereto, the Court being duly advised in the premises
and good cause appearing therefore, now orders that
under the terms of occupancy by the tenant-defendants,
to-wit:

Ellen K. Daskalas, an individual, dba The Pawn

Shop, The Pawn Shop, a Utah corporation, James Anderson,
an individual, dba Jim's Ribs, Terry Pantelakis, an
individual, dba AAA Jewelers and Loans, and Loans and
Sales, Inc., a Utah corporation of the subject premises,
said tenants have no right or claim to the proceeds to
be awarded in this action as just compensation and that
all sums paid pursuant to this Order of Immediate
Occupancy and by virtue of the final judgment of just
compensation shall be the sole property of, and are to

- 9 be paid directly to the owner-defendants, to-wit:
Juniata Irene Burge, Robert G. Barrows and Beatrice
Irene Barrows without notice to or approval by the
tenant-defendants.
Dated this /S

day of August, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

lomer F. Wilkinson
District Court Judge
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Special Counsel for Plaintiff
2230 University Parkway
Suite 9E
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William D. Oswald
FOX, EDWARDS, GARDINER & BROWN
57 West 200 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-7751
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF
SALT LAKE CITY, a public
entity,
Plaintiff,
ORDER OF IMMEDIATE
OCCUPANCY

vs.
JUNIATA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT
G. BARROWS; BEATRICE
IRENE BARROWS; ELLEN K.
DASKALAS, an individual,
dba THE PAWN SHOP, THE PAWN
SHOP, a Utah Corporation;
JAMES ANDERSON, an individual, dba JIM'S RIBS;
TERRY PANTELAKIS, an individual, dba AAA JEWELERS
AND LOANS; and LOANS AND
SALES, INC., a Utah Corporation;
Defendants.

Civil No. C85-4017

JUDGE: Hon. Homer F.
Wilkinson

Plaintiff's Motion.for an Order of Immediate
Occupancy and Defendant Burge, Barrows and Barrows'
Motion came on for a hearing pursuant to notice before

r:vanEL,-r-^

ii

fi'iOKtc;

- 2 The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Judge on
August 13, 1985 at 8:30 a.m., the plaintiff being
represented by Harold A. Hintze, Esq. and William D.
Oswald, Esq., and Michael Chitwood Executive Director of
the Salt Lake Redevelopment Agency being present, the
defendants Juniata Irene Burge, Beatrice Irene Barrows
and Robert G. Barrows being present and represented by
John T. Evans, Esq. the defendants Ellen K. Daskalas, an
individual, dba The Pawn Shop, a Utah corporation, James
Anderson, an individual, dba Jim's Ribs, Terry
Pantelakis, an individual, dba AAA Jewelers and Loans,
and Loans and Sales, Inc., a Utah corporation, neither
appearing personally nor by and through their attorney
of record .Jerome Moodyc JEsq. bjjf^said defendants ,having y[0UA/2Mrfo(
heretofore filed a Stipulation for Immediate Occupancy
which is on file herein, and Ray Zoll representing
himself as a property owner and as attorney for the
following land owners in Block 57, Plat "A", Salt Lake
City Survey and located at 235 South Main Street, David * J^c Cqju,
Mortensen, Erv Wilfred, and Harold Egan,.the parties and
other land owners having reached an open court
stipulation which has been recited and agreed to orally
before the Court on August 13, 1985, said Stipulation to
be the basis of an Order of Immediate Occupancy.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND
ADJUDGED:

- 3 1.

Plaintiff's Motion for an Order of Immediate

Occupancy of the following described property, to-wit : may be granted subject to and upon the following terms
ST

/ and provisions:

\

Beginning at a point 166 feet west of the
northeast Corner of Lot 6, Block 57 f Plat
"A" , Salt Lake City Survey, and running
thence east 69 feet to the center of a 17
inch party wall and which point is further
evidenced by a metal plug inserted in the
sidewalk
north
of
said
wall
by
R.W.
Sorensen, licensed surveyor; thence south
110 feet; thence west 68 feet; thence south
5 5 feet; thence west 1 foot; thence north
165 feet to the point of beginning,
(a)

Plaintiff shall pay into the Clerk of

the Court upon signing of .an Order of Immediate
Occupancy the sum of $275,220.00, being 100% of the
appraised value of the subject property based upon a
written appraisal obtained by plaintiff.

While retained

by the Clerk of the Court, said funds shall be invested
by the Clerk at the highest interest rate available for sJfy?&%~
federally insured accounts.

The plaintiff, however,

agrees and warrants that said funds will earn interest
at an effective rate of 11.5 annual percentage rate.for
the term of which they are held by the Clerk of the
Court, not to exceed a period of three years from the
date of the Order of Immediate Occupancy and that any
shortfall or difference between the actual interest
earned by virtue of the Clerk's investment and the 11.5

/T»/lM* % <f f3

- 4 annual percentage rate shall be paid by the plaintiff to
the defendants Burge, Barr/ows and Barrows .as herein
provided. While said funds are on deposit with the Clerk
of the Court, Any or\all/part of said funds may be
withdrawn hereafter at the optjpn of.defendants Burge,
Barrows and Barrows, or any of them, upon a written
demand of their counsel of record.

The withdrawal of

all or any part of said deposited funds by defendants
Burge, Barrows and Barrows shall constitute a waiver of
any and all defenses to the taking by condemnation of
the subject property as provided in Section 78-34-9,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, except the issue
of just compensation which shall be the sole issue
/

reserved for trial.
(b)

On entry of £b€ Order of Immediate

Occupancy^ the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City
shall submit.to Lincoln Property Company N.C., Inc.
(Lincoln) for signature arysrAgreement for Distribution
of Land for Private Development (ADD • Said ADL must be
fully executed by (£he Redevelopment Agency and jLincoln
within thirty (3oTdays from date ^ereof*

Within thirty

(3JL)—days from execution of theADL/\ the Redevelopment
Agency shall)exercise its option to purchase* the
property located at 235 South Main Street, owned by
Mountain States Creamery Company and David Mortensen,
pursuant to the written Offer to Purchase dated April 5,
;

,[^ J//

wVis-

^ i

^^v

V

/

CyMAl>m

- 5- P

1985 and the Extension Agreemer^ extending said Offer to
sixty (60) days from date hereof. 4uThe Redevelopment

y

Agency in disbursement ot^the^purchase price ^of said 1/'tiiv.t*
property may withhold and Mortensen authorizes the
Redevelopment Agency to pay to and assign to the
defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows from said funds,
and solely from said funds, ±he sum of $76,450.00 to be
paid to defendants Burge, Barrows and Bar BOWS/jipon the
closing of the Redevelopment Agency's acquisition of
David Mortensen1Si interest in the property located at
235 South Main Street-

Said sun} ofe $76,450.00 shall be

paid as additional compensation over and above any just
compensation ultimately found by the court or jury in
this case to be the fair market value of the property
being condemned herein and the receipt of said funds
shall not be an offset or deduction from said just
compensation and the receipt of the same shall not be
disclosed to the jury.

Upon payment to defendants

Burge, Barrows and Barrows of the sura of $76,450.00,
said defendants by receipt thereof, waive any and all
defenses to the taking by condemnation of the subject
property in the same manner as would occur by withdrawal
of funds deposited with the Clerk of the Court pursuant
to the aforementioned Section 78-34-9.
(c)

David Mortensen1s obligation in

regards to the payment of the aforementioned $76,450.00

'^NSaL
/ ^ ^

- 6 is solely conditioned upon the Redevelopment Agency's
election to exercise its right of acceptance under the
aforementioned Offer to Purchase the property at 235
South Main Street and if the fund from which this

',£ /

fsby

'^t

Purchase is not accepted by the Redevelopment Agency,
«

said Mortensen shall have no liability to make any
payments to the defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows by
virtue of this Ord

TTm^ « " f « f t * ^ h . AD

jnji^signed by Lincoln

>pmeiTt^-Ag«ficy.
/within th i rty
____

Property

(30) davs^f rom date^hereof^or^ the defendant land owners
11

^-^Tiave jatftT withdrawn all or part of the $275,220.00
deposited with the Clerk of the Court as herein

.-.

17

r.

P|^j^ied^eir=r£--the sum of $76,450.00 above provided has /
&&€ been (paid pursuant to the terms and provisions

/

IK

herein* 'then this Ore >r of> Immediate Occupancy is null

!<>

and void and upon Motion/of either of the parties, said
Order of Immediate Occ^p^ncy may be vacated upon a
showing that the ter^s an\jl provisions herein have not

-•1

been complied witl
(e)

2I

Based/ upon>AH

the oral Stipulation made to the Qburt,, the Court*'does
hereby enter an Order of Immediate Occupancy that the
subject property is sought for uses by the public in

'^^Jv

- 7 connection with and as part of a redevelopment project
authorized and approved by the City Council of Salt Lake
City and the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, and
the plaintiff is authorized to take immediate possession
of said property and continue in possession of the same
pending further hearing and trial on the issue of just
compensation which, subject to the terms and provisions
herein, is the only issue which may be raised in this
action as provided in Section 78-34-9, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended.

Plaintiff or its agents may

do such work thereon as may be required for the purposes
for which said property is sought to be condemned
including, but not limited to, demolition of existing
improvements and construction of new improvements or
structures, without interference by defendants or any of
defendants' partners, agents, or employees, however, no
demolition of the existing building^or^eviction of
existing tenants pursuant to said Order of Immediate
Occupancy will occur until the defendants have either
withdrawn part or all of the $275,220.00 deposited with
the Clerk of the Court as provided herein or have
received payment from David Mortensen through the
Redevelopment Agency of the $76,450.00 as herein
provided.
2^«

i
Defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows'

Motion in regards to the manner of disbursement of funds

HM(M;??

- 8 to be deposited with the Clerk as above described came
on for a hearing and no one appearing in opposition
thereto, the Court being duly advised in the premises
and good cause appearing therefore, now orders that
under the terras of occupancy by the tenant-defendants,
to-witi

uAAiM^/}

Juniata ikene Burge, Robert G. Barrows, and

Q —"Beatrice

Irene Barrows)of the subject premises, said

tenants have no right or claim to the proceeds to be
awarded in this action as just compensation and that all
sums paid pursuant to this Order of Immediate Occupancy

^

and by virtue of the final iudgment of just compensation
{ACUJ? Ml £LV <0 *<P / / > ^ ^ V V / QM4
.are to be paid diArectly ro^the owner-defendants, to-wit:
Juniata Irene Burge, Robert G. Barrows and Beatrice
Irene Barrows without notice to or approval by the
tenant-defendants.
Dated this

day of August, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

Homer F* Wilkinson
District Court Judge
APROVED AS TO FROM:
FOX, EDWARDS, GARDINER & BROWN
By
William D, Oswald
Attorney for Plaintiff
Redevelopment Agency of Salt
Lake City

non*;^:*
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John 25. Evans
Attcyrney f o r D e f e n d a n t s
Burge, Barrows and Barrows
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Ray Zoll
Attorney for Defendants
Mortensen, Wilfred and Egan
and Pro Se
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UTAH NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT ACT

11-19-23.9

funds belonging to them or within their control in any bonds and other obligations issued by an agency pursuant to this chapter. These bonds and other
obligations shall be authorized security for all public deposits. It is the purpose of this section to authorize any persons, political subdivisions, and officers, public or private, to use any funds owned or controlled by them for the
purchase of any such bonds or other obligations. Nothing contained in this
section with regard to legal investments shall be construed as relieving any
person of any duty of exercising reasonable care in selecting securities.
History: C. 1953, 11-19-23.8, enacted L.
1971, ch. 17, $ 25.

11-19-23.9. Agency authority within project area — Acquisition of property.
Within the project area an agency may:
(1) purchase, lease, obtain option upon, acquire by gift, grant, bequest,
devise, or otherwise, any real or personal property, any interest in property, and any improvements on it; or
(2) acquire real property by eminent domain; but when the power of
eminent domain is exercised under the provisions of this chapter and the
party whose property is affected contests the matter in the district court,
the court may, in cases where the amount of the award exceeds the
amount offered, award in addition to his just compensation, costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court. The court, or
jury in cases tried before a jury, may also award a reasonable sum as
compensation for the costs and expenses, if any, of relocating the owner
whose property is acquired or a party conducting a business on such
acquired property. An award may also be made for damages to any fixtures or personal property owned by the owner of such acquired property
or owned by the person conducting a business on such acquired property,
if such fixtures or personal property are damaged as a result of such
acquisition or relocation.
History: C. 1953,11-19-23.9, enacted by L.
1971, ch. 17, $ 26.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Fair market value.
Testimony as to the dollar value of the use of
an old building was properly excluded, since
the market value is determined by the price

which a willing purchaser would pay in view of
the best possible use of the premises. Redevelopment Agency v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47 (Utah
1974).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Note, Urban Planning and Development — Race and Poverty —

Past, Present and Future, 1971 Utah L. Rev.
46.
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^ATa

bridges to be constructed as part of the
project-and i(3) the earnings accruing from
the bonds proceeds, pending their use for
construction of the highway system. •*'•••' •-•
On May 24^ 1950, the Improvement Commission adopted a resolution! authorizing
. the issuance of the bondstieretdfofe^<ie^
bribed.' Chapter [25002, Acts of 1949, designated the highway system as State'Rokds
and authorized the use of the; proceeds of
the boilds for construction £f* the/project.
June15, 1950, the Improvement Conimissroh
End-the-State Road Department executed
the lease purchase agreement and the Board
of County Commissioners approved the use
of/ the.' three funds heretofore detailed; for
servicing the bonds.;..

[2] The second question is whether^
not* the provision in the lease
agreement for appointment of ¥
for the project drawn in question,]*
and valid.
Provision for appointment of a receive
under circumstances similar to thaf tj?1
case have been approved and -enforci
Hopkins v. Baldwin, 123 Fla. 649;:;lo7»^
677; State y. City of Tallahassee,^J?
476, 195 So. 402.
. "',. • * £ .
The appellants have failed to carry»
burden of showing error iii the contract;
other proceedings complained Of,'W-5!
judgment appealed from is affirmed!ni-:#'
Affirmed

In fine, the'lease purchase Agreement
vests title'to the highway system in the
Imprbvemeh'^Commis^ioh/'it provides that
the' Improvement Commission issue the
bonds and turn the proceeds over to the
State Road Department to construct the
highway system as1 the agent o f the' Im-i
provement Commission. The Improvement
Commission liases the highway • system to
the State'Road Department which agrees to
build and maintain said highway system and
operate the bridges as toll bridges, the rentals and other charges to be appropriated as
heretofore specified.
Section 16 (subdivision c) Article IX of
the. Constitution, F.S.A., authorizes 80 per
cent of tjie surplus, gas tax to be remitted
to the State Road Department for construction and reconstruction of county
roads, under various sections of Chapter
420 F.S.Ai At the request of ikhKtounty
.Commissioners, the State Rdad Department
is authorized to pledge future accruals'from
the 80 per cent of the two cent tax to the
credit of the icbunty. Other provisions
of the Statutes enumerated herein, authorize each step taken in this' transaction
S9 we conclude that the chancellor gave the
correct answer to question one. We find
ftothirig in the proceedings that could be
construed as pledging the' taxing lpWer to
service the bonds. State v..State Board
of Administration,'157 Fla, 360, 25 So2d
880; State v. Florida State Improvement
Commission,' 160'Fla, 230, 34 So2d 443.

ADAMS, C. J. and THOMAS 0 -1U
ROBERTS, JJ., concur
,,!., Ml
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DAOE COUNTY v. BRIGHAM et al. \<
Supreme Court of Florida, en. Banc -. v 0 M
March 14, 1950.
On Rehearing July 25,1950.

11

*t|r-

Eminent domain proceedings by Dad*
County, a political subdivision of the Stated
of Florida against E. F. P. Brigham;ian4^
others. The Circuit Court for Dade County^'
Charles A. Carroll, J., taxed fees, of exper^f
witnesses who testified for defendants /?V|jf
costs against petitioner, and petitioner^ r
brought certiorari. The Supreme ' Oou-* ^
Hobeoh, J., held that to extent 'that
were reasonably and necessarily incurredfuT
defense of condemnation case, they would*!)?
allowed.
" >»iieei
Certiorari denied.
Chapman and Thomas, JJ„ dissented.^
Terrell, J., dissented on rehearing.
See also, Fla^ 40 So.2d 835.
I. Eminent domain «=>265(3)
Alt
Under constitutional'provision declar^l
ing that private'property shall not be taken4!
without just compensation, costs in condenP^

1

-pxUmrr"!^

J^J^^^Vim^.'l^mAii^

Fla.
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cjJrbc'eedirigs include fees of expert diem for ordinary witnesses, the reason
JgteSeV 'for defendants. F.S.A. § 73.- for the rule'-being, that expert" witnesses
>JA'.Const Declaration of Rights, sell their services much as law services and
other professional services are sold, he is
not required by law to testify,' hence he must
[Eminent domain <§=>265(3)
be paid by the one who produces him."
afjcondemnation proceedings, the alTo recite and approve a general rule in
fpyanfiCf.or disallowance of fees of exfywitnesses for defendant is a matter for one case is-not the equivalent of establishe judge ; to decide in the exercise of ing it as an ^unyielding, inflexible guide in
every case. We clearly indicated we were
G§|g£odi judicial discretion.
not deciding that the general rule with reference to expert witnesses' fees would ob{Hudson? :&.Cason, Miami, John W. Mc- tain without exception. The question as
irter, Calvin Johnson, Tampa, and A. stated by Mr. Justice Terrell was "Whether
L^JtriBlack, Dania, David V. Kerns, Tampa or not the petitioner is required to pay the
charges of expert witnesses, including the
ijJ^jdJRis^on Boykin, Chattahoochee, for apcost of photographs and certified copies of
|$llantrr<
public records * * *.".' (Italics sup*F. P. Brigham, and T. C Britton, plied). We have held that an opinion em• ^ ^ 3 - . ^ Appellees..
anating from this Court must be construed
in the light of the facts and circumstances
^ ^ H O B S O N , Justice.
of the case which was then before us for
gfe!s^Dns casc *s before us on petition for decision. Pearson et al. v. Taylor, 159 Fla.
•itoof icertiorari. The primary and con- 775, 32 So.2d, 826; Kann v. American
Swllirig^question. presented for our deter- Surety Co. of New York, 120 Fla. 50,. 162
£jnination is whether the Circuit Judge erred So. 335; Shelfer v. American Agr. Chemi[^taxing the fees of expert witnesses who cal Co., 113 Fla. 108, 152 So. 611 After
ft&tifiedf*forthe appellees, defendants below, stating the question above quoted the writer
53*cdsis against the appellant, petitioner of that opinion then said:
flow, in'^"condemnation proceeding. The
"We can think of no reason why phototppellant insists that expert witnesses'
|f&3 v are not legal costs as contemplated graphs and certified copies of public records
It^'the statutes of the State of Florida and would have any place in the proof of 'full
jgrelwtiolly unauthorized by' law. In support compensation' or 'just value' for lands
i&'position the appellant relies heavily condemned for public use, but if in the disori'our opinion and judgment in the case cretion of the trial court such instruments
Df^tnland : Waterways-Development Co, were of use value in a condemnation proDity of Jacksonville, Fla., 38 So.2d 676, ceeding, we would not be inclined to hold
/'arid entertains the view that the opin- kin* in error except upon a very strong
P:and judgment in that case concluded showing of abuse of discretion." . (Italics
T
t question raised in this case favorable supplied.) . :
Appellant's position. We do 'not believe
The effect of our ruH'jrtg. was an affirm:
the holding in* the case of Inland Wa- ance of the Circuit Judge 'who disallowed
way Development Co. v. City of Jacksonexpert witnesses' fees. In the present case
supra, is necessarily or inevitably the Circuit Judge allowed expert witnesses'
htrblling.
fees and included them in the judgment.
a that case this Court, speaking through He gave sound, logical and cogent reasons
Justice Terrell simply stated the gen- therefor and determined that in this case
rule as follows:
expert witnesses definitely were of "use
i^Ai to the cost of expert witnesses, the Value" 'for they were essential in order for
lie generally approved is that the con- the defendants below to meet the plaintiff,
iraor i s not required to pay such costs Dade County, upon equal footing. We4
fahd the amount allowed by law as pet quote froin this order:

6Q4 ,F\**
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"Freedom ^to own and hold, property is
a, valued a,nd, guarded right .under our government t .Full compensation ^s,guaranteed
by the Constitution to those whose property
is divested from them by eminent domain.
The theory and purpose of that guaranty is
that the owner shall be made whole so far
as possible and practicable'.
"The courts should not be' blind to the
realities of the condemnation process. Any
excuse which the Court might have for disclaiming knowledge of just what goes on,
is entirely removed by the fact that the
Court itself views the trial and proceedings
and has personal knowledge of all such
matters. The Court sees that the County is
armed with engineering testimony, engineering data, charts and drawings prepared by expert draftsmen.
"The court sees that the County produces
appraisers, „ expert witnesses relating to
value, usually more than one in number,
whose .elaborate statement of their qualifications, training, experience and clientele
indicate a painstaking and elaborate appraisal by them calling for an expenditure
by fthe County of fees to such experts and
appraisers which are commensurate therewith, and customary for like services of
such persons. A lay defendant whose property is to be taken is called upon to defend
against such preparation and expert testimony of the County. It is unreasonable to
say that such a defendant must suffer a disadvantage of being unable to meet this array
of able, expert evidence, unless he shall pay
for the same out of his own pocket.
"Can the County contend that such high
priced evidentiary items are not a part of
the 'costs of the proceedings' when they
themselves by presentation of the same in
their case, make ^em a part of the proceedings in their behalf?0.
"It does not follow that all expenses to
which the defendant elects to put himself
in, connection wjth the defense of such a
case may be collected on a costs; judgment
J t i s the duty of the Court to inquire into
the items of cost, to be satisfied,, for exapiple. that,,the appraisers arc not too nunvj
e/ous, and that their charges arc proper,
that the engineering fees and charts, draw-

ings, maps, photographs etc. were^n
ably; considered necessary by^ .counsel*
defendants in, their handling, of rth« ^
and that they appear to the Court to- c &
been reasonably deemed necessary a}
kind and quantity, and the same applied ^
other costs which the Court may be7caile<iupon to allow which are outside of the^cS-'!
tomary law suit type of court costs consist:
ing of clerk's and sheriffs chargest-fcglJr*
witness per diem fees and simple report-^
ing charges."
-£§£,
"The evidence presented before me es»
tablished that the charges of the various
experts were reasonable and within < thfc
range of those customarily charged' ancU
paid in this community for serviced *Sf
similarly qualified persons for similar^Stfr *vices.
.' M^&\
"To the extent that costs are reasonably
and necessarily incurred in the defense of a
condemnation case like this they should f
be allowed, subject to court reviews thereof, and determination as to the necessity
ami propriety by the Court as' indicated
above."
' i £ i'
i.l r;.

r

[1, 2] The foregoing observations of the *
learned Circuit Judge need but slight,am> *
plification. We approve the logic of ,:hi* >
pronouncements. We might, and do,.add h
thereto the thought that Section 73>Hkl
Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A., which, <pro*v§
vides "All costs of proceedings shall be,paJ$ f
by the petitioner, including a,reasonable %tr'M
torney's fee * * * " should be construe*! ?>
in the light of Section 12 of ,our E>edarar!]»
tion of Rights, F.S.A., which declares thajt
private property shall not be taken "without
just compensation."
(Italics supplied
When so cpnstrued the language "All cost^j
of proceedings * * * " must be,,held*!
in a proper case, to include fees of exj
witnesses for the, defendants. The allow5
ance or disallowance of such fees should (I
a matter for the trial judge to decide in ,the\
exercise of sound judicial discretion.
Since the*« owner of private property,
sought to be condemned is forced into court
by.one to whom ,he owes no obligation,4 it
cannot be said that he ,has received "iv$$
compensation" for his property if he iscpmjj
pelled to pay out of his own pocket tfooy

:r

^a.
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\-jot establishing the fair value of the
< N> On'Rehearing. h"r ,
/* <
erty/ which expenses in some cases
[..conceivably exceed such value. The , PER CURIAM. ,, 4
t;pf jthe land owner in this situation
Pursuant'to an order» granting a reheariwHL stated by the New York court in ing and reargument in this cause, the Court
ufWater»» Supply in City of New York, has heard arguments of counsel for the reg ^ V p p . D i v . 219, 109 N.Y.S. 652, 654, as spective parties for the second time and, beInflows:; ;
ing now, fully advised in the premises, it is
&
- £?H$ does n o t w a n t t o seH- The property our conclusion that we should adhere to
gllfctekcn from him through the exertion of our former opinion and judgment entered
s ^ ^ b i g h powers of the statute, and the herein.
Ei drfrit of the Constitution clearly requires
It is so ordered.
ZTjjit he (shall not be thus compelled to part
TT jrfth what belongs to him without the payADAMS, C J., SEBRING, HOBSON
. ^tnt, not alone of the abstract value of the and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
" ifopcrty, but of all the necessary expenses
;* JJoorred in fixing that value. This would
TERRELL, CHAPMAN, and THOM^gfrrtn^to be dictated by sound morals, as AS, JJ., dissent
'J *eft as by the spirit of the Constitution;
~;f » d i t will not be presumed that the Legisrsmj>
MT «•*«• srtrm.
V IftlPS n a s intended to deprive the owner of
" ftgiproperty of the full protection which
]fcjp?>gsto him as a matter of right/'
% It is our view that we should deny certi" orari and uphold the order entered by the
\ CJrcuit Judge. In so doing we are not
JONES v. NEiBERGALL et al.
% tuning counter to our conclusion in the
Supreme Court of Florida, en Banc.
" IglfUu} (Waterway Co. suit for there we
Aug. 1, 1950.
* Upheld the general rule and the opinioa in
that case does not indicate that the ruling of
Suit by Paul Jones against Pauline Jones
A the Circuit Judge was challenged on the Niebergall and another for a declaratory de* ground of abuse of discretion. Had the cree construing the rights of the parties unp* (frcumstances there justified an exception der the will of Willie Jones, deceased. The
g, to ^tjic general rule, abuse of .discretion Circuit Court for Palm Beach County, C. E.
«£ Slight .have entered into that picture and Chlllingworth, J., rendered a decree for dem conceivably our opinion might have been fendants, and the complainant appealed.
¥* different. We sustained the invocation by The Supreme Court, 42 So.2d 443, affirmed
Per Curiam. The Supreme Court on recon^•^e ? trial judge of the "general rule" and
sideration, Per Curiam, reaffirmed decree of
is,exercise of sound judicial discretion in the chancellor without prejudice to the par*f^lying i t In this case we sustain the trial ties to recast the pleadings.
Eilfii^j.for recognizing an exception to the
Order accordingly*
^Jjcnepl rule" and his exercise of sound
aj discretion.
t. Appeal and error <§=>839(l)
Where appellant contended for first
tforari denied.
time on reconsideration that order affirming
to^MS, C J., and TERRELL, SE- chancellor's decree created inequitable sit|BMNG and ROBERTS, JJ., concur. '
uation, but pleadings had not presented
^PMAN and THOMAS, JJ., dissent such equities nor had the trial court ruled
qn t^iem, and, they were not urged until on
.,JBM?MAN and THOMAS, Justices reconsideration, they wpuld not be adjudicated, but either party could recast thejr
I f f ^ s s c n t £^e Inland .Waterway Dc 7 pleadings, a^d in a subsequent hearing bepment Company ct al. v. City of Jack- fore the chancellor such issues could be determined and ruled on
ille, Fla., 38 So.2d 676.

